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 Steven Mailloux
 EVALUATION AND
 READER RESPONSE CRITICISM:
 VALUES IMPLICIT IN AFFECTIVE STYLISTICS
 The reader is a limited god:
 constrained yet creative. In reader-centered criticism the emphasis
 is carefully placed upon the interaction of this creative god with a
 delimiting text. This emphasis is at one and the same time a critical
 strategy, a leap of faith, an ultimate concern, and a moral imperative.
 Hyperbolic as it may seem, the theological metaphor provides
 an initial insight into "reader response" criticism, especially
 Stanley Fish's "Affective Stylistics."1 In examining Fish's "Lit-
 erature-in-the-Reader Approach," I will underscore the naïve
 humility of its critic-priest and prove the misleading nature of the
 following statement: Fish's "method ... is oriented away from
 evaluation and toward description."2 Evaluation (on several levels)
 is inherent in the assumptions and methods of Affective Stylistics
 (which purports to be merely a descriptive procedure).
 As a critical strategy, Affective Stylistics is that approach "in
 which the focus of attention is shifted from the spatial context
 of a page and its observable regularities to the temporal context
 of a mind and its experiences."3 In order to accomplish this shift
 of focus, in order to make the new focus acceptable to skeptical
 critics, Fish redefines an evaluative term: a literary work "is no
 longer an object, a thing-in-itself, but an event, something that
 happens to, and with the participation of, the reader. And it is this
 event, this happening- all of it and not anything that could be said
 about it or any information one might take away from it- that is,
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 I would argue, the meaning" ("Lit. in the Reader," p. 125). Fish
 redefines meaning as an event (instead of information content) in
 order to place a greater importance on that event, to give it a new
 significance by bestowing on it a higher priority of interest (a
 value). That is, Fish takes an evaluative term with the highest
 positive connotations and places it approvingly on the experience
 of the reader in interacting with the text: meaning is significant;
 the reading experience is meaning; therefore, the reading experience
 is significant. An evaluative process is implicit at the very inception
 of the method. Does it stop here? I think not, but I will return to
 this question after a brief treatment of Affective Stylistics as
 description.
 Fish describes his method as "an analysis of the developing
 responses of the reader in relation to the words as they succeed
 one another in time" ("Lit. in the Reader," pp. 126-27). Thus,
 Fish dedicates himself to a description of the interaction of reader
 and text during the temporal reading process. He relies on empirical
 evidence (from psycholinguistics and perceptual psychology) and
 on intuitive insights into his own responses and those of other
 critics.4 Fish's use of psycholinguistic research is especially
 indicative of his descriptive goals. He mentions the work of T. G.
 Bever and claims that the psycholinguist's "analyses of perceptual
 strategy can help" a practitioner of Affective Stylistics ("What Is
 Stylistics?" p. 151). Fish's attraction to psycholinguistics is
 understandable: it provides empirical support for his method's
 descriptive power', support that claims to be objectively verifiable
 (an attractive assertion to Fish in his defense against charges of
 impressionism). Psycholinguistics presents evidence that what Fish
 terms "the structure of the reader's experience" is a psychological
 reality; i.e., the process of interaction between reader and text
 does occur as Fish describes it.
 Fish has always been willing to face questions about the
 validity of his concept of the structure of the reader's response. For
 example, he has said, "Many of the suggestions that have been made
 to me both in print and in private are that there's no such thing as
 the 'reader's experience' or anything that you can ever talk about.
 That at the very least I would have to abandon the claim that I'm
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 getting back to something primary and, if I wanted to claim any-
 thing, just claim this as another metaphor . . . that the reader's
 experience that I describe is simply not the experience any reader
 has ever had, but that it's an after-the-fact result of my having
 worked through some problems . . . and, having reached a solution
 to those problems, translated that solution into the terms of what I
 call a reader experience methodology."5 These are not new issues;
 compare past statements such as "experience is immediately com-
 promised the moment you say anything about it" and "the least
 (and probably the most) we can do is proceed in such a way as to
 permit as little distortion as possible" ("Lit. in the Reader,"
 p. 160). These earlier qualifications have at times been raised to
 the level of critical cracks in the model. However, these objections
 are not as forceful as they first appear. (Or better: they are
 extremely forceful, yet they do not destroy the operative validity
 of the model.) The fact is that Fish will never be able to prove
 conclusively that his description of the general structure of the
 reader's response is completely accurate. Nevertheless, his insights
 will be persuasive if he continues to cite (and test the approach
 against) intuitive, empirical, and critical evidence and continues
 to admit that his model can only be an approximation of the
 reader's response.6 Indeed, Fish's "structure of the reader's
 experience" is a metaphor as are all human descriptions, but in its
 rigor and focus it is the best metaphor, the closest approximation
 of reader response now available. Most other critical approaches are
 merely abstractions of abstractions by comparison.
 One final note on psycholinguistics and Affective Stylistics
 as description: Fish has commented that psycholinguists "have
 determined that . . . reading proceeds by a series of decisions. They
 call these decisions 'computations' or 'calculations.' That is, for
 them the decision that a reader makes is simply to be regarded as
 something preliminary to the settling, to the arriving at meaning.
 Very simply, what / do is make the focus of my analysis those
 decisions that readers make. And I give those decisions first content
 and then value. "7
 I return now to the subject with which this essay began:
 values within the Literature-in-the-Reader Approach. Value is
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 "any object of any interest," writes R. B. Perry.8 Victor Hamm
 points out another sense of the word: " value . . . which we
 employ so readily and ingenuously, denotes to the metaphysician
 a good he recognizes as a property of being."9 These two comple-
 mentary senses of the term will be stressed in the discussion that
 follows.10
 As seen in his attraction to the empirical description of
 psycholinguistics, Fish embraces the notion of a purely descriptive
 capacity for Affective Stylistics. He regards "evaluation not as a
 theoretical issue but as a subject in the history of taste."1 1 In
 fact, Fish carefully avoids the term evaluation in any reference to
 his approach, except to describe what it is not: "My method allows
 for . . . no such fixings of value. In fact it is oriented away from
 evaluation and toward description" ("Lit. in the Reader," p. 146).
 This extreme hesitancy to use the term results at times in his
 confusing interpretation (explanation) with what is actually eval-
 uation. For example, in describing the reader's experience at the
 end of Heart of Darkness, Fish calls the reader's moral evaluation
 of Mario w's lie "the final interpretive decision." Fish states that
 "what this novel has done is disabled you as an interpreter in the
 sense that the final pages call for an interpretation . . . one that
 you are not able to deliver."12 Rather, the novel has not made an
 interpretation impossible (Fish's own interpretation is evidence of
 that), but instead it has made evaluation (judgment of value- in
 this case ethical value) impossible for the reader.
 Fish's meticulous care to avoid evaluative terms seems a result
 of his desire to guard against a mistake similar to that of the stylis-
 ticians he criticizes: "the absence ... of any connection between
 their descriptive and interpretive acts" ("What Is Stylistics?"
 p. 148). Fish's approach validly bridges the gap between description
 and interpretation (making them one and the same), but he
 zealously avoids making what he considers an Unjustified jump
 from interpretation to evaluation. He implies that there is no
 connection between his interpretive and evaluative acts. I would
 like to discuss the inevitability of making just such a connection
 within his Literature-in-the-Reader Approach.
 The answers to the following questions illustrate the impor-
 tance of implicit values in Affective Stylistics:
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 (1) Where should a literary critic focus his attention? (Definitional
 Value)
 (2) What is the "proper response" to literature? (Normative or
 Prescriptive Value)
 (3) How is "good" literature distinguished from "bad" literature?
 (Comparative Value)
 (4) What ethical concerns are present? (Ethical Value)
 Concerning Definitional Value: Where should a literary critic
 focus his attention? Affective Stylistics is explicit in its answer:
 the interaction of reader and text, the structure of the reader's
 response, the reader's experience. I don't think it is trivializing
 Kierkegaard's phrase to call this answer a "leap of faith." As Earl
 Miner observes, a reader response critic begins with "the pre-
 sumption that attention to the reader is a critical necessity"
 (my italics).13 That is, an Affective Stylistician believes that the
 reader's experience is most important in literary criticism, and he
 requires no self-justifying proof for this belief. The reader's
 response becomes an "ultimate concern" in this critic's literary
 microcosm; everything else in his interpretation becomes significant
 only in terms of its relation to this ultimate concern. He establishes
 a value.
 The recognition of the ultimate value of the reader's response
 results in "a procedure which is from the very beginning organizing
 itself in terms of what is significant" ("What Is Stylistics?" p. 149).
 In other words, as Fish writes earlier (pp. 148-49), "an interpreting
 entity, endowed with purposes and concerns, is, by virtue of its
 very operation, determining what counts as the facts to be ob-
 served; and, moreover, that since this determining is not a neutral
 marking out of a valueless area, but the extension of an already
 existing field of interests, it is an interpretation." Or more
 precisely an evaluation.
 This initial positing of value, then, determines what else is
 seen as significant. Thus, Fish values the activities of the reader:
 "the making and revising of assumptions, the rendering and
 regretting of judgments, the coming to and abandoning of con-
 clusions, the giving and withdrawing of approval, the specifying
 of causes, the asking of questions, the supplying of answers, the
 solving of puzzles." Finding "value in temporal phenomena,"
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 Fish especially emphasizes the commitment and choice of the
 reader in his progressing interaction with the text.***
 Evaluation, then, is implicit at the very inception of the
 Literature-in-the-Reader Approach: first, the reader's response is
 seen as significant and good- reading involves "what it is to be
 human"- ("What Is Stylistics?" p. 148); and then the activities
 within that response (decisions, commitments, etc.) are valued as
 part of the reader's experience. Whether a comparative or ethical
 value is also given to all of these activities remains to be seen.
 Concerning Normative or Prescriptive Value: What is the
 "proper response" to literature?
 '"What is being specified from either perspective [authorial
 intention or reader response] are the conditions of utterance, of
 what could have been understood to have been meant by what
 was said" ("Int. the Variorum ," p. 476). Reading requires certain
 things of the reader: he must do them in order to read. In this way,
 Affective Stylistics joins Speech Act Theory and moves from
 description to evaluation, from is to ought- from "the reader is
 reading" to "he ought to respond to the conditions of utterance."
 (As Searle points out, this commitment to reading conventions has
 "no necessary connection with morality."15)
 A second prescriptive value is posited by Fish when he
 describes his "Informed Reader." After specifying some of the
 characteristics of the Informed Reader, Fish comments: "I would
 want to say that his experience of the sentence will be not only
 different from, but better than, his less-informed fellows" ("What
 Is Stylistics?" p. 146, n. 36). A conditional imperative is implicit
 here: If a reader wants to get the best experience (a more forceful
 phrase than "proper response") in reading, then he must possess
 the characteristics of the Informed Reader, i.e., he should be or
 become an informed reader. Prescriptive statements become more
 explicit in Fishian sentences beginning, "What he [the reader] does
 (or should do) . . ." ("Lit. in the Reader," p. 136). Description
 and evaluative prescription seem closely intertwined in such
 analysis.
 Fish has raised a question about his method that involves
 another type of prescription: "Is this method a method of reading
 or an analysis of what's happening in the reading process? Am I
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 training people so that they will read differently than they ever
 have before or am I training people to be able to bring to analytical
 light what they've been doing when they've been reading? . . . Strong
 claim: progressively make conscious what's been happening sub-
 consciously; or is it: work in this method forms what you're going
 to be doing?"1 ^
 Is the method analysis or training, description or prescription?
 This question can be answered in two ways: First, if the method
 leads to an accurate analysis of the structure of a reader's response,
 the teaching of the method will reinforce (by making more
 self-conscious) this reading process. So, though the question is
 "either/or" the answer is "both": Affective Stylistics is both
 analysis and training. Second, if the method does not produce an
 accurate analysis of a reader's response, then another question
 arises: could the teaching of the method train the reader to read in
 a manner radically different from the way he naturally does? If yes,
 then at the very least the training must actualize some potentiality
 already present. Then the question becomes: should this poten-
 tiality be actualized?
 In sum, if the model is valid, then Affective Stylistics first
 describes the commitment of the reader to certain conventions
 and hypothesizes an Informed Reader who has "better" reading
 experiences; then it prescribes that a reader must commit himself
 to the reading conventions in order to read and that a less-informed
 reader should become an informed reader. If the model is not
 valid, then the teacher/ critic must decide whether to actualize
 the potentialities affected by the Literature-in-the-Reader method.
 In other words, with the model valid, Affective Stylistics involves
 prescriptive values; with the model invalid, the question becomes
 one of comparative and ethical values. I will proceed as if the model
 were valid (the former assertion), but in so proceeding I will
 directly deal with the issues raised in the latter question: com-
 parative and ethical values.
 Concerning Comparative Value: What is "good literature"?
 Or what response should good literature provoke? Here Fish meets
 the evaluative question head-on: "My method ... is oriented away
 from evaluation and toward description. It is difficult to say on
 the basis of its results that one work is better than another or even
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 that a single work is good or bad."1 ^ Is Fish's disclaimer misleading?
 Are there any "literary values" (necessarily comparative) that can
 be inferred from the Literature-in-the-Reader Approach?1® (Of
 course, for the reader response critic any literary values must
 be defined in terms of reader experiences.)
 Fish's work implies a view of art explicit in the writings of
 several critics: Art is valued disorder. Morse Peckham and Wolfgang
 Iser, among others, view art in this way. Peckham writes, "Art is
 rehearsal for those real situations in which it is vital for our
 survival to endure cognitive tension, to refuse the comforts of
 validation by affective congruence when such validation is in-
 appropriate because too vital interests are at stake; art is the
 reinforcement of the capacity to endure disorientation so that a
 real and significant problem may emerge." Likewise, Iser comments,
 "If reading were to consist of nothing but an uninterrupted building
 up of illusions, it would be a suspect, if not downright dangerous,
 process: instead of bringing us into contact with reality, it would
 wean us away from realities. . . . There are some texts which offer
 nothing but a harmonious world, purified of all contradiction
 and deliberately excluding anything that might disturb the illusion
 once established, and these are the texts that we generally do not
 like to classify as literary."1 ^
 In these passages Peckham and Iser seem to embrace the
 evaluative criterion of disorientation. Compare Fish who writes,
 "In general I arri drawn to works which do not allow a reader
 the security of his normal patterns of thought and belief. It would
 be possible 1 suppose to erect a standard of value on the basis of
 this preference- a scale on which the most unsettling of literary
 experiences would be the best (perhaps literature is what disturbs
 our sense of self-sufficiency, personal and linguistic)- but the
 result would probably be more a reflection of a personal psycho-
 logical need than of a universally true aesthetic" ("Lit. in the
 Reader," p. 147). That is, disorientation for Fish is a personal
 preference, unconnected (he feels) with his method which only
 describes/interprets and doesn't evaluate; according to Fish, the
 Literature-in-the-Reader Approach erects no standard of value on
 the basis of the disorienting effects it seems to find so often within
 the reader's experience (its ultimate concern).
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 It is easy to see, however, that Affective Stylistics lends itself
 to being "linked up" with such evaluative standards: critics (Fish,
 Iser, Peckham, and others) with an evaluative bias toward "literature
 as disorientation" could easily use a methodology that values
 (makes significant) commitments, choices, judgments, and other
 reader confrontations with text. Indeed, Affective Stylistics, as
 an approach to the reader's experience, seems to put pressure on
 the critic using it to value certain literary criteria, e.g., disorienta-
 tion. This tendency refers us backward to the evaluative assumption
 upon which the Literature-in-the-Reader Approach was based and
 forward to a concern with the ethical values also implicit in the
 method. The ultimate concern for the reader's experience and the
 disorienting content of many of those experiences leads us from
 literary value to ethical value (the valued effects of that dis-
 orientation). •
 Concerning Ethical Value: What ethical concerns are implicit
 in the approach?
 Walter Fisher, a rhetorician discussing value-laden discourse,
 argues that "Human communication implies, if it does not
 explicitly present, contentions and conceptions of the good."^ A
 set of ethical values can be observed in any type of discourse, be
 it public address, literature, or literary criticism. Affective Stylistics
 is especially susceptible to such analysis. The Literature-in-the-
 Reader method, especially as applied by Fish, is a morally-based
 approach to literature. It is concerned with ethical values in at
 least three ways: it describes ethical attitudes actualized in the
 reader by the text; it begins with ethical assumptions about
 reading and being human; and it pressures the critic to accept
 certain ethical values, i.e., the use of the method "is productive of"
 ethical values.
 An important part of the subject matter of Affective Stylistics
 involves ethical attitudes formed by the reader in his interaction
 with the text. The reader is pressured to judge, to take stands, to
 become committed (in an ethical sense), to evaluate, that is, to
 concern himself with moral issues (goodness, right action) while
 reading literature. Numerous examples can be cited from experien-
 tial criticism: "This, then, is the structure of the reader's ex-
 perience-the transferring of a moral label from a thing to those
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 who appropriate it" (discussing Comus in "Int. the Variorum,"
 p. 475) and "You are invited to take contradictory moral attitudes
 toward the various personages who turn up in the novel" (Taped
 lecture: "On Conrad's Heart of Darkness"). Of course, this interest
 in moral questions is a descriptive concern of the method and not
 an ethically evaluative one. But this interest does indicate the
 inevitable involvement with morality in the method's treatment
 of literature.
 My second point is less a descriptive aspect of the approach and
 more an evaluative one. Affective Stylistics has as its ultimate
 concern the experience of the reader. This concern is arrived at
 through an evaluative leap of faith by the reader response critic.
 He places the highest possible value (literary and ethical) on the
 reading experience: "notions of what it is to read ... are finally . . .
 notions of what it is to be human" ("What Is Stylistics?" p. 148).
 Fish writes elsewhere: "my set is toward the message for the sake
 of the human and moral content all messages necessarily display." 2 1
 Continually, Fish makes morally evaluative judgments: "my larger
 objection [to the goal of the stylisticians] is that it is unworthy,
 for it would deny to man the most remarkable of his abilities, the
 ability to give the world meaning rather than to extract a meaning
 that is already there" ("What Is Stylistics?" p. 134). And this
 moral objection is not accidental nor is it an idiosyncrasy of Fish;
 rather it is a direct consequence of his method's ultimate concern,
 the reader.
 I would contend, then, that at the very center of Affective
 Stylistics is a pressure to hold and promote certain ethical values.
 There is at the very least a directing force within the method-
 initiated by its ultimate concern (with the reader) and focused by
 its subject matter (confrontation with text)- to see literary dis-
 orientation as an ethical value. That is, since the reader is the
 central concern of Affective Stylistics, and since disorientation in
 his interaction with the text helps him to grow, literary disorienta-
 tion is morally valuable (it is good). The reader's enrichment
 through temporary disorder in literary experience is central to the
 approaches of critics like Iser and Peckham. And to quote Fish
 again: "perhaps literature is what disturbs our sense of self-
 sufficiency, personal and linguistic."22 This evaluative insight does
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 not merely illustrate a "psychological need" (as Fish suggests),
 but rather it evidences a pressure that exists within the method
 itself.
 In 'The Bad Physician: The Case of Sir Thomas Browne,"23
 Fish carefully distinguishes between part one in which he uses his
 method on Browne's prose and the second part which he claims is
 his personal evaluation unconnected with his Literature-in-the-
 Reader Approach. Fish notes that in Browne's work "the moment
 of insight reflects backward to his skill rather than inward to our
 edification." Fish sums up his evaluation: "In brief, what sets
 Browne apart from those with whom he shares so much is the
 absence in his work of their intentions, which are rhetorical in a
 very special sense. They seek to change the minds of their readers
 .... In all of these works, an uncomfortable and unsettling
 experience is offered as the way to self-knowledge, in the hope that
 self-knowledge will be preliminary to the emergence of a better
 self, with a better (or at least more self-aware) mind." Fish
 concludes these comments with a revealing remark: "And by
 offering that experience rather than another, these works shift the
 focus of attention from themselves and from what is happening in
 their formal confines to the reader and what is happening in the
 confines of his mind and heart" (p. 371). Thus, edifying dis-
 orientation within these valued devotional writings (excluding
 Browne's) leads us back to the ultimate concern, the reader.
 There is a circularity here not of argument but of effect:
 The reader and his response are valued; disorientation is valued
 because it helps the reader grow, i.e., he becomes a better reader
 and person; and thus his reading experience becomes more
 valuable. Fish argues, "I can simultaneously say that the use of this
 approach will not only allow you to see what you've been doing
 while reading but will make you a better performer in reading
 which is what Milton wants you to do, but that's not what
 everybody wants . . . the Miltonie aesthetic is unique . . . not one
 that can be applied to everyone" (Taped lectqre: "On Doubts about
 Affective Stylistics"). As a matter of fact, the experiential critic
 does apply it to everyone (not descriptively, but evaluatively):
 authors, readers, and critics should (and usually do) want the
 reader to perform better. This imperative is, again, a direct result
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 of the ultimate concern with the reader's experience. The reader
 response critic values that text which, for example, disorients the
 reader and helps him to grow- to become a better reader and
 person. This is a good, a positive ethical value for the experiential
 critic. Affective Stylistics, then, is not only generally evaluative but
 also specifically moral.
 Fish's Literature-in-the Reader Approach to criticism is the
 most convincing method available that claims to approximate the
 reader's experience. Within the approach other literary theories
 are "redefined in terms of potential and probable response"
 ("Lit. in the Reader," p. 145). Therefore, if the structure of the
 reader's response is considered of utmost importance, then other
 literary approaches describing response to response should take
 their starting point from such experiential criticism.
 Though outwardly embracing only the descriptive capabilities
 of his method, Fish appears to be restraining a desire to bring in
 evaluative criteria. He admits a "hierarchy" in his own tastes, and
 points out that he only works (in print) with texts of indisputable
 literary value. Though he admits his own evaluation and recog-
 nizes the evaluative function of criticism, he makes no attempt
 (and in fact denies the possibility) of linking his methodology
 with evaluative criteria by virtue of any intrinsic logic of the method.
 René Wellek, among others, stresses that "the final task of the
 critic is evaluation."24 If Affective Stylistics is to help redirect
 the attention of critics away from an objective, spatialized text
 and toward the temporal reading experience, then some attempt
 must be made to show either that it is possible to link up the
 method with evaluation or that the method's assumptions require
 certain evaluative criteria (evaluative criteria derived directly from
 its basic assumptions).
 Since Affective Stylistics is a method of analysis that examines
 the moment-by-moment experience of the reader as he is being
 pressured by the text, the results of this analysis can be used by
 many schools of criticism as raw material Gust as Affective Stylistics
 uses the formalist insights of New Criticism and Linguistics). A
 Marxist critic will see if the reader is being manipulated in an
 orthodox manner, the Myth critic will ask what archetypal re-
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 sponses to the reading experience occur, etc. These critics will dis-
 cuss the "response to a response" ("Lit. in the Reader," pp. 1 47, 1 62
 n. 31), and they will go off in as many different directions as
 there are critics.
 I have contended, however, that Affective Stylistics, when
 its assumptions are properly understood, holds forth the possibility
 either that a certain approach to evaluating literature arises out of
 the assumptions of the method or that the ethical assumptions
 point to restraints upon the directions that critics can go with the
 analysis. These are restraints on the description of the response to
 a response, and these restrictions call for a consistency between
 the method and the evaluative theory to which the method is linked,
 i.e., the ethical assumptions of Affective Stylistics demand that the
 method be used by certain value-related schools of criticism.
 "Criticism, insofar as it is rational inquiry, cannot escape from
 the limitations placed upon it by its basic assumptions. As with
 theologians, each school of critics naturally believes in its own
 premises."^ As I have shown in this essay, the assumptions and
 methodology of Affective Stylistics are value-laden. Furthermore,
 the ethical values arising out of its premises make the Literature-
 in-the-Reader method more appropriate to humanistic approaches
 to literature, those which value the growth of the reader. My most
 important claim is what I have been emphasizing in the last part
 of this essay: Affective Stylistics is a moral approach' to literature
 in and of itself.
 NOTES
 ^For a concise introduction to reader response criticism, see Earl Miner,
 rev. of Self-Consuming Artifacts, by Stanley Fish, JEGP, 72(October 1973),
 53643.
 Stanley Fish, "Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics," New
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 will be cited in the text.
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 the Variorum Critical Inquiry , 2(Spring 1976), 465-85.
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 Southern California, May 24, 1974.
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 model is an interpretation of reality rather than an approximation of it"
 ("Facts and Fictions: A Reply to Ralph Rader," Critical Inquiry, 1 [June 1975] ,
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 pp. 477-85.
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 Quoted in Vernon J. Burke, History of Ethics (Garden City: Doubleday
 and Co., 1968), II, p. 105.
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 "From Ontology to Axiology: A Critical Problem," College English
 (November 1970), 147.
 ^n his chapter "Values in American Society," Robin Williams, Jr.,
 defines "values" in a way that comes close to combining these two senses
 (significant and good); he writes that values are "those conceptions of
 desirable states of affairs that are utilized in selective conduct as criteria for
 preference or choice or as justifications for proposed or actual behavior"
 ( American Society : A Sociological Interpretation , 3rd ed. [N.Y., 1970],
 quoted in Walter R. Fisher, "A Normative Theory of Rhetoric: Its Rationale
 and Its Logic," unpublished manuscript, p. 47).
 11 "Facts and Fictions," p. 891, n. 7.
 ^^Taped lecture: "On Conrad's Heart of Darkness ," Univ. of Southern
 California, May 21, 1974.
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 Rev. of Self-Consuming Artifacts, p. 536.
 ^"Int. the Variorum ," pp. 474, 470; subsequent references to this article
 will be cited in the text. In "Facts and Fictions" Fish writes that "as we read
 we hypothesize comprehensive intentions, get through tangles of references,
 eliminate ambiguities, exclude or rule out partial and incomplete meanings;
 but where [Ralph Rader] believes either that we do these things only once or
 that only one of the times we do them counts, I believe that we do them again
 and again (as many times as we are moved to perceptual closure) and that
 each instance of our doing of them (not merely the last) has value" (p. 891).
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 Lit. in the Reader," p. 146; earlier Fish writes: "The question is not
 how good is it, but how does it work; and both question and answer are framed
 in terms of local conditions, which include local notions of literary value"
 (p. 146).
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 Olson, "Value Judgments in the Arts," Critical Inquiry , l(September 1974),
 71-90; Olson defines value as "a relative attribute of something in virtue of
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